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One of the most recurrent themes in Richard Rorty’s recent political 
philosophy is the role of religion in modern liberal democracies. Rorty 
has consistently held the view that religious belief is an irreducibly 
priváté matter, and as such irrelevant to public political practices. 
Although his commendation of a privatized religion founders on the 
premise that it is an inalienable right of everyone in a liberal democracy 
to hold any religious faith without the compulsion to justify it in terms 
acceptable to a secular community, religious believers could well regard 
his proposal as an undemocratic attempt at their exclusion from the 
political sphere. Given Rorty’s staunch commitment to liberal democratic 
values, it would certainly be unwarranted to accuse him of political 
exclusionism, yet I contend in what follows that his uncompromising 
antifoundationalism leaves him no other avenue of approach to religion 
bút that of criticism, which he seems willing to undertake in politically 
conceived discussions. His övért political skepticism, however, is 
mitigated, as it were, by an apparent tolerance when he construes religion 
on an epistemological hasis. In two sections below, I will investigate this 
dichotomous interplay between Rorty’s epistemological and political 
interpretations of religion, arguing that—despite his attempt to set them 
apart—the two are inextricably intertwined. In the second, I will 
concentrate on Rorty’s reading of William James’s “The Will to Believe,” 
in which Rorty discusses religious faith as “unjustifiable.” My contention 
is that his claim is plausible only if we reinstate the distinction between 
faith and reason, which Rorty, due to his skepticism about foundational 
epistemology, wholeheartedly opposes.
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Religion as politics and as epistemology
In the pást two decades, Richard Rorty has shown a growing 
interest in issues related to religion, which is evidenced by the publication 
of several essays and a recent book,1 despite the fact that throughout his 
oeuvre he has repeatedly professed himself an “atheist,” a “militant 
secularist” (Boffetti 24), an “anticlericalist” (“Anticlericalism” 33), or, at 
his blandest, “religiously unmusical” (“Anticlericalism” 30). In fact, 
Rorty’s skepticism about religion is fueled by the same distrust that he 
bears against foundationalist epistemology and, by implication, pro- 
fessional philosophy. Religion, much like foundationalist epistemology in 
terms of humán knowledge, promises to provide ultimate answers to 
perennial questions of humán existence in an attempt to render all further 
humán inquiries superfluous. Analogously, traditional philosophy, in 
Rorty’s view, “sees itself [...] [as] foundational in respect to the rest of 
culture because culture is the assemblage of claims to knowledge, and 
philosophy adjudicates such claims” (Mirror 3). The belief that 
philosophy is able to adjudicate all claims to knowledge can easily be 
mapped onto the religious believer’s faith in the omnipotence of the deity 
s/he believes in.
Rorty’s antiessentialist view of philosophy dovetails with his 
political inclinations, fór he holds that the dismantling of foundationalism 
paves the way fór a democratized and solidary culture whose members 
are sufficiently “nominálist and historicist” to believe that “nothing has an 
intrinsic natúré, a reál essence,” thus being more willing to abandon 
essentialism and pemicious forms of ahistorical thinking (Contingency 
74). Envisaging his liberal utópia, Rorty casts his large-scale 
antiessentialism in explicitly antireligious terms when he urges that “we 
try to get to the point where we no longer worship anything, where we 
treat nothing as a quasi divinity, where we treat everything—our 
language, our conscience, our community—as a product of time and 
chance” (Contingency 22). He alsó infers the desirability and plausibility 
of the deposal of metaphysics frorn the post-Enlightenment dethronement 
of religion: he argues that the idea of a culture without religion before the 
Enlightenment must have appeared no less utópián than the idea of a 
postmetaphysical culture might appear in contemporary liberal 
democracies. The decline of religious faith, he contends, “and specifically
The Future o f Religion (2005), which comprises his conversation with Gianni Vattimo.
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the decline of people’s ability to take the idea of postmortem rewards 
seriously, has nőt weakened liberal societies, and indeed has strengthened 
them” {Contingency 85). Moreover, in order fór the utópián liberal culture 
to function properly, it has to be fully “de-divinized.” As he argues:
[I]n its ideál form, the culture of liberalism would be one which was 
enlightened, secular, through and through. It would be one in which no 
trace of divinity remained, either in the form of a divinized world or a 
divinized self. Such a culture would have no room fór the notion that 
there are nonhuman forces to which humán beings should be 
responsible. [...] The process of de-divinization [...] should, ideally, 
culminate in our no longer being able to see any use fór the notion that 
finite, mortal, contingently existing humán beings might dérivé the 
meanings of their lives from anything except other finite, mortal, 
contingently existing humán beings. (Contingency 45)
Rorty, however, is known to have made even more poignant 
remarks to the detriment of religion. As Jason Boffetti reports, he bluntly 
stated in a public lecture that the Enlightenment was “right to suggest that 
religion is something that the humán species would be better if it could 
outgrow” (24). Boffetti alsó quotes Rorty as reminding his audience of 
Diderot’s notorious claim that “the last king should be strangled with the 
entrails of the last priest,” adding that “even though somé of my best 
friends are priests, I feel somé sympathy with all these critics of religious 
institutions” (24).
In Rorty’s more recent texts, the militant rhetoric is somewhat 
softened, though his critique has become no less severe. He stipulates, 
nonetheless, that his criticism is motivated by “anticlericalistic” rather 
than “atheistic” impulses, to stress its distinctively political edge, in that it 
is directed at “ecclesiastical institutions,” nőt at individual believers 
(“Anticlericalism” 33). He outright claims that despite “all the comfort 
they provide to those in need or in despair,” these institutions “are 
dangerous to the health of democratic societies” (“Anticlericalism” 33). 
Religion, he continues this line of thought, “is unobjectionable as long as 
it is privatized—as long as ecclesiastical institutions do nőt attempt to 
rally the faithful behind political proposals and as long as believers and 
unbelievers agree to follow a policy of live and let live” 
(“Anticlericalism” 33).
Rorty traces this line of political reasoning back to Thomas 
Jefferson, quoting his famous maxim in approval: “it does me no injury 
fór my neighbor to say that there are twenty Gods or no God” (“Priority”
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175). Nevertheless, in a society whose political practices are thoroughly 
secularized, it is imperative to find a way of “privatizing religion— 
keeping it out of [...] ‘the public square,’ making it seem bad taste to 
bring religion intő discussions of public policy” (“Conversation-Stopper” 
169). The democratic tolerance towards religion comes at the price of 
what Rorty dubs the “Jeffersonian compromise,” according to which 
religious believers should “remain willing to trade privatization fór a 
guarantee of religious liberty” (“Conversation-Stopper” 171). Thus, the 
religious “must abandon or modify opinions on matters of ultimate 
importance [...] if these opinions entail public actions that cannot be 
justified to most of their fellow citizens” (“Priority” 175).
While privatization appears to be a reasonable price to pay fór 
religious freedom frorn an atheist’s point of view, religious advocates 
might well look upon it as the curtailment of that very freedom. Stephen 
Carter’s The Culture o f Disbelief is certainly s case in point, which 
provoked a response from Rorty with the teliing title, “Religion As 
Conversation-Stopper,” in which he argues that the “main reason religion 
needs to be privatized is that, in political discussion with those outside the 
relevant religious community, it is a conversation-stopper” (171). Carter, 
however, finds it objectionable that the relegation of religion to the 
priváté sphere leaves such a narrow discursive space to the faithful that 
their religion-specific arguments become inconsequential outside that 
limited space. Rorty quotes Carter as saying:
[T]he effort by contemporary liberal philosophers to create a 
conversational space in which individuals of very different viewpoints 
canjoin [in] dialogic battle, in accord with a set of dialogic conventions 
that all can accept. The philosophical idea is that even though all of us 
have differing personal backgrounds and biases, we nevertheless share 
certain morál principles in common. [...] [The problem is that] all these 
efforts to limit the conversation to premises held in common would 
exclude religion from the mix. [...] [The solution would be to form] a 
public square that does nőt restrict its access to citizens willing to speak 
in a purely secular language, bút instead is equally open to religious and 
nonreligious argument. (qtd in Rorty, “Conversation-Stopper” 170-71)
Carter, from his own vantage point, makes a convincing case: in his 
view, what he is asked to do is disparage his faith by declaring it 
politically insubstantial. Rorty’s statement to the effect that religion needs 
to be excluded from the public square because it is a conversation-stopper 
must strike him as merely a question-begging attempt at silencing
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religious voices in political debates. To Carter, it seems highly 
paradoxical that liberal democracies are founded on the ideál of an open 
and inclusive discursive space, capable of accommodating several 
conflicting viewpoints, whereas the religious find themselves excluded 
and trivialized by the champions of this very ideál.
This contradiction can be seen to inhabit Rorty’s argument, in that 
the success of his democratically conceived attempt to accommodate 
religious faith within the discursive space of a secularist society is 
predicated on the extent to which he is capable of proving religion to be 
antithetical, if nőt outright detrimental, to liberal democratic values. Rorty 
seems to be well aware of this tension, which is why he tries to blunt the 
exclusionist edge of his rhetoric by arguing that the privatization of 
religion is in the best interest of the religious themselves. His rejoinder to 
Carter is that the fear of being excluded is founded on “the [false] premise 
that the nonpolitical is always trivial” (170). Rorty urges that religion be 
treated like poetry: nonpolitical, yet having the potential of being a matter 
of vitai importance fór certain individuals—a priváté pursuit that “both 
give[s] meaning to individual humán lives and [...] [is] such that mature, 
public-spirited adults are quite right in nőt attempting to use them as a 
basis fór politics” (170). This analogy makes Rorty’s argument no less 
problematic, fór it implicitly raises doubts as to whether religion is 
capable of providing the believer with a Weltanschauung as compre- 
hensive as to accommodate politics. He seems to suggest, thereby, that 
one’s religion cannot constitute an acceptable set of beliefs to rely on in a 
public conversation unless it is purged of its specifically religious content. 
Furthermore, Rorty’s insistence on a depoliticized religion gains 
relevance only within a politicized discursive space: despite his intention 
to the contrary, his argument cannot escape being articulated in political 
terms.
There is, however, a notable change of heart to be observed in 
writings where Rorty construes religion in epistemological, rather than in 
political terms. He endorses the classical pragmatist view of religion, 
which rests on Charles Sanders Peirce’s redefinition of beliefs as “habits 
of action” as opposed to representations. Antirepresentationalism in this 
context consists in the view that religion can be construed as a set of 
social and discursive practices (adopted with or without reflection), which 
constitute, rather than represent, one’s faith. This is, in fact, the reversal 
of the traditional metaphysical model which posits belief as an essentially 
internál property, and treats any linguistic utterance of religious content as
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the expression—externalization—of one’s faith. The reversal consists in 
the claim that faith is nőt a property one can de facto intemalize or 
extemalize, bút, rather, one claims oneself a believer from within a certain 
set of discursive practices. It is due to the assumptions resulting from 
these practices that, fór instance, the believer sees providence where the 
nonbeliever sees mere contingency. Thus, one’s actions and utterances are 
nőt merely representations of faith, bút its very abode. This anti- 
foundationalist approach to religious faith is cogently phrased by Gary 
Wihl in his discussion of the broader issue of conviction: “Convictions do 
nőt appear as representable things in and of themselves, separate from 
their concrete embodiment. The language of convictions, therefore, does 
nőt function like a representational médium” (10).
We can take Wihl’s account of conviction to be applicable to 
religious faith, in that his formulation argues against the existence of a 
nondiscursive object of representation to which faith can be shown to 
correspond. It alsó implies that any faith or conviction can be firmly held 
inasmuch as certain assumptions constitutive of that faith remain 
unexamined, or even inaccessible. Fór this reason, if a religious 
believer—given that s/he is sufficiently aware of the distinctively 
philosophical sense of “representation”—were consciously to reflect on 
his/her language when involved in somé kind of religious practice (such 
as praying), s/he would be unlikely to differentiate between his/her words 
being representations and those being constituents of his/her faith. 
Moreover, the ability to make this differentiation might undercut the 
distinctively religious content of one’s faith simply on account of the 
epistemological (or rationalizing) natúré of the reflection. Thus, fór very 
different reasons, “the language of convictions” can be accepted as being 
nonrepresentational by the pragmatist antifoundationalist and by the 
religious believer alike: to the former, this fact is a logical corollary of 
discarding traditional epistemological distinctions, while to the latter, 
his/her religious conviction constitutes a foundation firm enough to be 
sustained without epistemological underpinnings.
This curious affinity seems to account fór Rorty’s conciliatory 
attitűdé toward religion, nőt least because once he resolutely tums his 
back on foundational epistemology, he cannot appeal to classical 
distinctions between faith as an epistemologically dubious form of 
thought, and something less dubious like rationality. As he outright States 
at one point: the “claim that [...] we [atheists] are appealing to reason, 
whereas the religious are being irrational, is hokum” (“Religious Faith”
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172). At another point, he criticizes Sidney J. Hook fór championing 
Science as a model fór pragmatist thought, and fór debunking faith in the 
face of rationality. Hook antagonizes Science and theology by reference to 
their differing attitudes toward “the mysterious:” “one tries to solve 
mysteries,” Hook says, “the other worships them [...] [and] believes that 
somé specific mysteries are final” (181). Rorty, by contrast, claims that 
the “anti-scientific, holistic pragmatist [which he considers himself to be] 
[...] wants us to adopt naturalism without thinking of ourselves as more 
rational than our theistic friends” (“Without Method” 66). Pragmatists, 
Rorty adds, should settle fór “the laissez-faire attitűdé that sees religion 
and Science as alternative ways of solving life’s problems, to be 
distinguished by success or failure, rather than rationality or irrationality” 
(“Without Method” 66). In short, religion and Science can, at best, be 
demarcated by reference to the different purposes they serve as social and 
discursive practices, nőt along illusory epistemological lines.
This pragmatist argument revolves around the assumption that 
appealing to reason when justifying a knowledge claim yields no more 
foundational validity (in an epistemological sense)l than appealing to 
faith. This insight, however, does nőt exempt us from the necessity to be 
able to teli the “right” sort ofjustification from the “wrong” one, since, as 
we can surmise from Rorty’s foregoing politically-charged argument, 
there is much at stake when it is to be decided whether a certain 
justification does or does nőt fali in with the discursive norms of a 
community. In this specific context, marking out the right kind of 
justification is of crucial importance, if one is to argue convincingly either 
fór the inclusion, or fór the exclusion of religion in/from the public 
square. Further, the ability to make a differentiation between religion 
conceived in political terms, and religion conceived in epistemological 
terms presupposes a method of somé sort whereby one can isolate the 
“purely” epistemological from the “purely” political content in the 
argument of one’s religious interlocutor. Nonetheless, once the 
distinctions between faith and reason (neither being more or less 
epistemologically sound than the other), or between truth andjustifiability 
(both being functions of social and discursive practices) have been 
blurred, there is no reason to retain the dividing line between the political 
and the epistemological either—in other words, there is no such thing as 
“pure content” (epistemological or political) to be isolated. Fór this 
reason, it is misleading to construe Rorty’s attitűdé toward religion as 
oscillating between “epistemic acceptance” and “political dismissal,” fór
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that would presuppose two essentially distinct antithetical poles, which 
allow one to switch back and forth between them at will. Rather, the two 
kinds of attitűdé can be seen as intertwined, amounting to a critique of 
religion that is more tangled than to admit of the neat economy of 
binaries.
What obfuscates the binary pattem is the fact that Rorty’s criticism 
of religion stems from his thoroughgoing antiepistemological persuasion. 
His dismissal of foundational epistemology, in its turn, can be seen as the 
prerequisite of his defense of religion in the face of rationality. Rorty’s 
comprehensive argument against foundationalist epistemology, in turn, 
extends to include religion as one possible form of thought which posits a 
putatively ultimate foundation which is instrumental in adjudicating 
knowledge claims. Nonetheless, it is only from the premise of the vacuity 
of such epistemological foundations that Rorty’s endorsement of religion 
can be plausibly argued fór. Thus, ironically enough, the platform on 
which Rorty is willing to grant the practical use of religious faith is 
predicated upon the insight that religion, as subsumed under the notion of 
foundationalist epistemology, is a redundant nonsubject, and, as such, due 
to be disposed of. In other words, once we concede Rorty’s argument that 
epistemological foundationalism is to be overthrown, it becomes 
impossible to ascribe even a deflated (priváté) significance to religion.
In the section below, I will probe Rorty’s claim that religious faith 
is virtually unjustifiable in the context of William James’s related 
arguments. I contend that “unjustifiability” yields the same political 
verdict fór religion as “privatization” does.
Faith and justification: reading Rorty via James
In classical pragmatism, the dismissal of the faith-reason dichotomy 
is arguably most emphatic in William James’s “The Will to Believe.” In 
his seminal essay, James bluntly claims to be “defending the legitimacy 
of religious faith” in the face of “somé rationalizing readers” (449), being 
represented in the essay by the British mathematician and philosopher, 
William Kingdon Clifford. Clifford held the rigidly rationalist view that 
“[b]elief is desecrated when given to unproved and unquestioned 
statements, fór the solace of the priváté pleasure of the believer. [...] It is 
wrong always, everywhere, and fór anyone, to believe anything upon 
insufficient evidence” (qtd in “The Will” 461-62). James argues that if
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one were to agree with Clifford on the wrongness of holding religious 
beliefs on insufficient evidence, one might be withheld from the hope of 
having something greater than oneself to hold onto: “one who should shut 
himself up in snarling logicality,” James contends, “and try to make the 
gods extort his recognition willy-nilly [...] might cut himself off forever 
from his only opportunity to make the gods’ acquaintance” (476). James 
identifies the difference between religious belief and other kinds of belief 
by relating the former to one’s “passiónál natúré,” the latter to one’s 
“intellect” (rationality). He States his thesis as follows: “Our passiónál 
natúré nőt only lawfully may, bút must decide an option between 
propositions whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its natúré be 
decided on intellectual grounds” (464). This thesis is indicative of James’ 
attempt to blur the distinction between faith and reason in repudiation of 
the metaphysical notion of an all-encompassing epistemology, bút he still 
does nőt seem to break entirely with epistemologically-conceived 
distinctions.
Despite the apparent affinities between their positions, Rorty 
severely criticizes James fór his equivocation, which he takes to be an 
undesirable (and avoidable) relapse intő the paradigm of foundational 
epistemology (“Religious Faith” 154). In critique of James’ above-quoted 
thesis, Rorty objects that “James accepts exactly what he should reject: 
the idea that the mind is divided neatly down the middle intő intellect and 
passión, and the idea that possible topics of discussion are divided neatly 
intő the cognitive and the noncognitive ones” (“Religious Faith” 155). 
Rorty thinks that James should nőt have drawn a distinction between 
“intellect” and “emotion,” bút, rather, he should have “distinguish[ed] 
issues that you must resolve cooperatively with others and issues that you 
are entitled to resolve on your own” (“Polytheism” 37). Religion, 
according to Rorty, is clearly the latter sort of issue: like Romantic art, he 
argues, religion is a “paradigmatic project of individual self- 
development,” in that it does nőt require intersubjective agreement like 
natural Sciences or law, which are “paradigmatic projects of social 
cooperation” (“Polytheism” 35). Rorty, however, does nőt so much blur 
the cognitive-noncognitive distinction as reformulates it in terms more 
congenial to his neopragmatist discourse by substituting the socially- 
conceived dichotomy of public and priváté fór the invidious 
epistemological dualism. The new distinction certainly makes it more 
difficult to dismiss religion with the offhand gesture of Tendering it 
“irrational,” bút it alsó makes it vulnerable to an alternative form of
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dismissal: one that is based on the thoroughly pragmaticized view of 
religious faith as a dispensable add-on to culture.
To spell out what is at stake in Rorty’s argument, it is worthwhile to 
examine how he reiterates the rationale fór the socially-conceived split in 
his recent work. He contends: “If social cooperation is what you want, the 
conjunction of the Science and common sense of your day is all you need. 
Bút if you want something else, then a religion that has been taken out of 
the epistemic aréna, a religion that finds the question of theism versus 
atheism uninteresting, may be what suits your solitude” (Future 39). 
Using the word “solitude”2 points up yet another affinity between Rorty 
and James. In The Varieties o f Religious Experience (1902), James 
defines the object of his inquiry as follows: “Religion [...] shall mean fór 
us the feelings, acts, and experiences o f individual mén in their solitude, 
so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they 
may consider the divinén (36). “Solitude” in both James and Rorty 
signifies the nonepistemic natúré of religious experience, which entails 
that shared norms of commensuration may nőt be applied to explicate it. 
James alsó contends that Science—the paradigmatic discourse of 
epistemic commensuration—merely “catalogues her elements and records 
her laws indifferent as to what purpose may be set forth by them, and 
constructs her theories quite careless of their bearing on humán anxieties 
and fates” (Varieties 440). Humán anxieties and fates are to be tackled at 
an individual level, which, according to James, is the very purpose 
religion serves. As he goes on to add:
The pivot round which [...] religious life [...] revolves, is the interest of 
the individual in his priváté personal destiny. Religion, in short, is a 
monumental chapter in the history of humán egotism. The gods believed 
in [...] agree with each other in recognizing personal calls. Religious 
thought is carried on in terms of personality, this being, in the world of 
religion, a fundamental fact. Today, quite as much as at any previous 
age, the religious individual telis you that the divine meets him on the 
basis of his personal concems. (440)
James’s claim fór the individualization of religion would, in 
principle, explain away the need fór the common ground of epistemology. 
With faith having become an irreducibly priváté matter, religious
2
See alsó “Religion As Conversation-Stopper,” where Rorty, in reference to Whitehead, 
defines religion in pragmatic terms as “‘what we do with our solitude,’ rather than 
something people do together in churches” (169).
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experience takes singular forms nőt translatable intő communal terms, 
which, however, has anomalous consequences regarding the cultural 
sustainability of religion. By positing the radical privacy of religious 
faith, one undercuts the status of religion as a discursive practice, or as a 
language game whose rules can be mastered (or, at least, observed) on 
account of which it would be capable of being publicly shared. As a 
consequence, religion can be saved only at the expense of demotion: once 
we acknowledge that the singularity of one’s religious experience is 
exempt from communal accountability, religious discourse gets inevitably 
isolated from the secular public discourses of the given community, 
whereby its cultural impact gets drastically reduced. Radically priváté 
experience presupposes a radically priváté language which, constituting 
an incommensurable conceptual scheme, makes conversation between the 
religious and the nonreligious next to impossible.
Nevertheless, conceding the privacy of various forms and instances 
of religious experience serves very different purposes fór James and 
Rorty. James’ aim in Varieties is to chart out the psychology, or, one 
might say, phenomenology of religious faith based on numerous case 
studies whose specific content, though connected by various intracultural 
elements, proved to be singular to the individual case being investigated. 
In Rorty’s usage, however, “solitude” assumes a function analogous to his 
notion of “priváté irony”: it serves to argue that religion, being 
nonepistemic, can and should retreat from public discourse (“Anti- 
clericalism” 36), bút this retreat is one that religion can only benefit from. 
Fór this retreat to occur, Rorty argues, nőt only the notion of rationality, 
bút alsó the “pursuit of universal intersubjective agreement” should be 
abandoned by religious people (“Anticlericalism” 36). His explanation 
runs as follows:
[I]f you identify rationality with the pursuit of universal intersubjective 
agreement and truth with the outcome of such a pursuit, and if you alsó 
claim that nothing should take precedence over that pursuit, then you 
will squeeze religion nőt only out of public life bút out of intellectual 
life. This is because you will have made natural Science the paradigm of 
rationality and truth. Then religion will have to be thought of either as an 
unsuccessful competitor with empirical inquiry or as “merely” a vehicle 
of emotional satisfaction. (“Anticlericalism” 36-37)
The force of the argument is contingent on accepting Rorty’s 
hypothesis that “rationality” and “universal intersubjective agreement” 
are interchangeable terms. It is hard to see, however, the compelling
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reason fór conceding the validity, let alone the inevitability, of the 
hypothesis. Intersubjective agreement is highly conceivable within and 
among religious communities, whose members might even make a point 
of avoiding the semblance of “rationality” in discourses on matters of 
faith. Conversely, it is alsó possible that a religious believer wittingly 
appeals to rational reasoning when devising a religious argument fór 
fellow-believers or when justifying his/her faith to nonbelievers. Rorty 
does nőt explicitly deny the plausibility of these options, bút he does hold 
the view that refraining from rationality and thereby from participating in 
conversations in the “public space” of the “epistemic aréna” (“Anti- 
clericalism” 36) is an opportunity that religious believers would do well 
to act upon. As he contends:
[T]o say that religion should be privatized is to say that religious people 
are entitled to opt out of this [epistemological or political] game. They 
are entitled to disconnect their assertions from the network of socially 
acceptable inferences that provide justifications fór making these 
assertions and draw practical consequences from having made them. 
(“Anticlericalism” 37-38; emphasis added)
By saying that “religious people are entitled to” choose to stop 
playing their language game by publicly acceptable rules, Rorty seems to 
suggest that it is to their privilege that they can do so, while participants 
in scientific, political, or philosophical conversations are required, willy- 
nilly, to abide by the consensual discursive norms of their respective 
discourses. In the rest of this section, I will argue that that nőt only are the 
religious required to keep to communally acceptable discursive rules 
when devising arguments fór their faith, bút it might well be a 
prerequisite of articulating the distinctively religious content of their 
beliefs.
To unfold the argument, we need to revisit James’ above-quoted 
thesis in “The Will to Believe,” which can be read as advancing the 
Central antifoundationalist claim that “evidence” as the tokén of “truth” is 
just as much a matter of belief as religious faith, fór there is no ultimate 
court of appeal which could conclusively adjudicate among various 
knowledge-claims: “The desire fór a certain kind of truth [...],” James 
observes, “brings about that special truth’s existence” (“The Will” 473). 
What James is articulating here is by no means a paradigmatic ideálist 
statement: instead, he argues that “evidence” and “truth,” just like faith, 
are intersubjectively formulated social/cultural constructions. As he puts
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it: “Our faith is faith in someone else’s faith, and in the greatest matters 
this is most the case. Our belief in truth itself, fór instance, that there is a 
truth, and that our minds and it are made fór each other—what is it bút a 
passionate affirmation of desire, in which our social system backs us up?” 
(“The Will” 463).
The Rortyan claim that religion is what one does in one’s solitude 
may be seen as a corollary to James’s implicit suggestion that becoming 
religious means taking up a certain habit of action (rather than, say, that 
of epiphany), so the primary question to be raised is nőt how this habit 
squares with the social/political climate or the scientific findings of the 
day, bút how the religious believer can benefit from his/her faith. James’s 
genuinely pragmatic insight is that the legitimacy of one’s religious faith 
is nőt determined by epistemological validity or communal arbitration, 
bút solely by its utility: “On pragmatic principles, if the hypothesis of 
God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, [it] is true” 
{Pragmatism 618). Rorty endorses this Jamesian view, which he restates 
as follows: “Do nőt worry too much about whether what you have is a 
belief, a desire or a mood. Just insofar as such States as hope, lőve and 
faith promote only [...] priváté projects, you need nőt worry about 
whether you have the right to have them” (“Religious Faith” 155). In 
other words, you are under no compulsion tojustify your religious beliefs 
(desires, moods) to your (nonreligious) peers as long as you keep them 
priváté.
This, however, is nőt quite what James suggests. Following right 
after the above-quoted sentence about utility being the only test of one’s 
faith, James goes on to add: “Now whatever its residual difficulties may 
be, experience shows that it [the hypothesis of God] certainly does work, 
and that the problem is to build it out and determine it so that it will 
combine satisfactorily with all the other working truths” {Pragmatism 
618). It would be wrong to surmise, however, that the acts of “building 
out” and “determining” the “hypothesis of God” are solely matters of 
individual volition: what James designates as “all the other working 
truths” can be taken to mean “justified” beliefs shared by a certain 
community.
Fór the “hypothesis of God” to combine satisfactorily with the 
shared beliefs of a thoroughly secularized community, however, either the 
communally defined discursive practices and processes ofjustification, or 
the hypothesis needs to be so radically modified that neither could be 
recognized as bearing out its original function. On the one hand, if
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communal agreement on justificatory processes is adjusted to apply to 
religious beliefs, certain entrenched (because hitherto justifiable) beliefs 
are bound to be discarded as being incompatible with the newly acquired 
(hereupon justifiable) ones. In this case, however, the justificatory 
processes themselves are in danger of getting distorted to the point of 
losing their capability of yielding epistemic consensus (unless the very 
concept of justification is radically altered). On the other hand, if the 
“religious hypothesis” is to be made plausible even to atheists, the 
hypothesis itself, while leavingjustificatory processes intact, gets deflated 
to such an extent that its distinctively religious content is likely to 
evaporate. This seems to imply that the justification of one’s religious 
faith in the face of a secular community (like the secularized institutions 
of contemporary liberal democracies) can be spelled out in terms 
acceptable fór that community, or the very need tojustify religious faith is 
to be abandoned altogether.
To be able to argue coherently fór beliefs which do nőt stand in 
need of justification, Rorty makes a distinction between religious belief 
and other kinds of belief, asserting that “pragmatist philosophy of religion 
must follow [Paul] Tillich and others in distinguishing quite sharply 
between faith and belief’ (“Religious Faith” 158). “Belief,” in this 
pragmatist sense, is a habit of action that one might be called upon to 
justify when involved in a “common project” which requires a 
responsibility “to ourselves to make our beliefs cohere with one another, 
and to our fellow humans to make them cohere with theirs” (“Religious 
Faith” 149). According to Rorty, one should nőt expect this kind of 
coherence from religious believers, which implies that they are free to go 
withoutjustifying their faith to others:
Liberal Protestants, to whom Tillich sounds plausible, are quite willing 
to talk about their faith in God, bút demur at spelling out what beliefs 
that faith includes. Fundamentálist Catholics, to whom Tillich sounds 
blasphemous, are happy to enumerate their beliefs by reciting the Creed, 
and to identify their faith with those beliefs. The reason the Tillichians 
think they can get along either without creeds, or with a blessedly vague 
symbolic interpretation of creedal statements, is that they think the point 
of religion is nőt to produce any specific habit of action, bút rather to 
make the sort of difference to a humán life which is made by the 
presence orabsence of lőve. (“Religious Faith” 158)
By referring to lőve, Rorty seems to be making the case that nőt 
only is faith exempt—by subjective volition—from having to be justified
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to others, bút it is virtually inexplicable. Rorty cites as an example a 
parent’s or spouse’s lőve, which “often seems inexplicable to people 
acquainted with those spouses and children” (“Religious Faith” 158). By 
implication, we can infer from the inexplicability of faith to the 
explicability of belief, bút this inference runs the danger of reinstating the 
epistemological dichotomy of the cognitive and the noncognitive 
(rationality and irrationality), which Rorty is ever so eager to discard. 
Furthermore, Rorty does nőt make a convincing case fór his allegation 
that one’s religious faith can be enclosed in a putatively priváté sphere, 
insulated from the beliefs of others as well as from one’s own different 
kinds of beliefs.
He seems to be aware of how problematic his claim is, as he poses 
the question at one point: “Can we disengage religious beliefs from 
inferential links with other beliefs by making them too vague to be caught 
in a creed [...] and still be faithful to the familiar pragmatist doctrine that 
beliefs have content only by virtue of inferential links to other beliefs?” 
(“Religious Faith” 159). Fór, he goes on to ask, “what becomes of inter- 
subjectivity once we admit that there is no communal practice of justi- 
fication—no shared language game—which gives religious statements 
their content?” (“Religious Faith” 159). Rorty’s answer is that we can still 
make sense of utterances of religious content by correlating them with 
certain “patterns of behavior, even when we cannot do so by fixing the 
piacé of such utterances in a network of inferential relations” (160).
What Rorty seems to be suggesting is that the atheist and the 
religious believer are speaking different languages proper, as if they were 
communicating from within remote cultures. He fails, however, to take 
intő consideration the possibility that the religious believer can appeal to 
his/her secularist interlocutor’s language game to argue fór his/her faith. 
This assumption could be valid only if religious faith, like any other 
belief, were nőt always already contextualized in an epistemologically 
and politically constrained conversational space, without which it would 
nőt be possible to ascribe any cultural value to religion in the first piacé. 
As a consequence, nőt only are religious believers under constant 
compulsion to justify their faith to those who do nőt share it, bút they are 
alsó compelled to rely on a publicly accepted language game fór them to 
be taken seriously in the given debate.
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